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This is a story about the Constitution that begins with some rather
shocking facts: The parchment that all of us-practitioners, judges, schol-
ars-have been using for the last century as the definitive copy of the
supreme law of the land, is not. The handwritten, handsigned document
enshrined in the National Archives and reprinted everywhere was never
ratified by "We the People of the United States." Even the Senate is on
record as acknowledging that this revered document has virtually no legal
significance.' No kidding.
Fortunately, the document that was ratified by Americans in the late
1780's-an edition printed in New York several days after the signing of
the parchment in Philadelphia-bears a close resemblance to the text we
have all grown up with. Although the official printed archetype of the
Constitution (whose existence has for many years been a well kept if un-
intended secret) is marked by different punctuation and capitalization, the
words are the same as those in the familiar parchment.' Thus, the Na-
tional Archives version is probably good enough for government work.3
If, then, little of immediate legal consequence turns on the existence of
the real Constitution, why do I raise the issue? First, because the story of
how Americans have come to forget the official text of the Constitution
t Assistant Professor, Yale Law School. This story was composed for a Bicentennial baby, Drew
Wright, YLS 2012, in the hope that it might prove useful as he and his generation lead our nation
towards its Tricentennial. Special thanks to James Hutson, Cathy lino, and Ron Wright for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. See S. Doc. No. 49, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-94 (1961) (historical notes authored by Denys P.
Myers). Section I of this essay owes a great debt to the archival labors of Mr. Myers. See also
Rapport, Printing the Constitution: The Convention and Newspaper Imprints, August-November
1787, PROLOGUE, Fall 1970, at 69 (discussing early printed editions of Constitution).
2. With de minimis exceptions, see infra text accompanying note 43.
3. See infra note 25.
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We ratified makes for an interesting tale in itself, and one that should be
told in this Bicentennial year. Second, because that tale has some impor-
tant lessons for us about law, history, and the way that storytelling colors
both of them.
I. A TALE OF Two CONSTITUTIONS
On September 15, 1787, the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention
finally reached agreement on a complete set of words. After nearly four
months of deliberations carefully veiled from outside scrutiny, the Conven-
tion was ready to go public with its product. But precisely how, logisti-
cally, to do this? In a world without floppy disks, word processors,
photocopiers, facsimile printers, or even mimeograph machines, 18th cen-
tury Americans generally relied on two technologies to generate hard cop-
ies of legal texts: engrossing (handwriting) and printing. The men at Phil-
adelphia availed themselves of both on September 15. Although James
Madison's notes are uncharacteristically silent on this point, his fellow
delegate James McHenry of Maryland recorded the following entry in his
daily journal:
15 Sepr.
The question being taken on the [Constitution] agreed to
unanimously-
Ordered [Constitution] to be engrossed and 500 copies struck
[printed]-Adjourned till monday the 17th."
Convention President George Washington's September 15 diary entry
confirms McHenry's:
[A]djourned 'till Monday that the Constitution which it was pro-
posed to offer to the People might be engrossed-and a number of
printed copies struck off.5
Both engrossing and printing were carried out under the direction of
the Convention's Committee of Style, which on September 17 presented
the assembly with a single four page engrossed copy for endorsement.6
After the text was read aloud, and a last-minute amendment agreed to
and penned in, 39 of the 42 delegates present registered their assent to the
plan by signing the parchment.7 The Convention then charged Secretary
4. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 633-34 (M. Farrand rev. ed.
1937) [hereinafter FARRAND RECORDS].
5. 3 id. at 81.
6. S. Doc. No. 49, supra note 1, at 51.




William Jackson to deliver the document to the Congress organized under
the existing Articles of Confederation, sitting in New York City.8
Although it is possible that each Convention delegate carefully ex-
amined the parchment before endorsing it, such a tedious practice would
have painfully slowed the signing ceremony, since no more than two or
three delegates could have examined the document simultaneously. More
likely, each delegate simply referred to his own printed copy of a draft
Constitution that the Committee of Style had distributed on September 12,
and that had served thereafter as the Convention's working paper. Many
delegates may well have assumed the parchment to be identical to the
September 12 draft, as amended-an assumption apparently confirmed by
the oral reading of the engrossed document. In fact, this assumption was
false: The two versions differed in small ways-e.g., punctua-
tion-unlikely to be detected by any delegate listening to the reading of
the engrossed copy while carefully following along by reading his own
copy of the September 12 print.
On September 18, the 500 official printed copies that had been author-
ized three days earlier were struck and distributed to the remaining dele-
gates. As with the September 12 draft print, however, the September 18
print punctuated the constitutional text quite differently from the en-
grossed parchment signed on September 17.' Indeed, the punctuation of
the September 18 print diverged considerably from its September 12 pre-
cursor as well. For example, the earlier print used periods after each enu-
meration of legislative power in Article I, section 8, whereas the Septem-
ber 18 document used colons. (The parchment used semi-colons, and thus
differed from both prints.)
On September 20, William Jackson reached New York and laid before
Congress the engrossed Convention report. Apparently, the parchment
was once again read aloud, but here too, each delegate probably relied on
his own printed copy.10 In any event, when Congress voted unanimously
on September 28 to send the proposed Constitution to the People of each
state for ratification, Secretary of Congress Charles Thompson reprinted
100 copies of the September 18 print for transmission to the states."
No one in the several states had access to the signed parchment buried
in the files of Congress in New York. Rather, the September 28 reprint of
the September 18 print was itself reprinted-with great fidelity-in lots
of up to 10,000 for mass distribution to the polity.12 This was the version
submitted to the People of the United States as they chose their delegates
8. 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 4, at 650 (notes of James McHenry).
9. Cf. infra text accompanying note 25.
10. S. Doc. No. 49, supra note 1, at 49, 52, 55. These printed copies were based on the Septem-
ber 18 print, which had been reprinted in New York City on September 22 by a local publisher, John
McLean, in his Independent Journal or, The General Advertiser. Id. at 54-56, 69.
11. S. Doc. No. 49, supra note 1, at 56-57, 69-70.
12. Id. at 57, 70.
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to various ratifying conventions. This was the version that those ratifying
conventions in turn used. And this was the version that 9 out of 13 ratify-
ing conventions expressly included in their formal instruments of ratifica-
tion submitted to Secretary Thompson."t
By 1789, eleven state conventions had ratified the new Constitu-
tion-enough for it to go into effect under Article VII. One of the first
acts of the new Congress was to authorize the printing of "a correct copy
of the Constitution of the United States."" This copy, published in 1789
by Francis Childes and John Swaine, "printers to the United States,"
followed, with minor printing deviations, the printed archetype of Septem-
ber 28, 1787-not the engrossed parchment.1 5
Unfortunately, in the confused administrative transition from govern-
ment under the Articles to government under the Constitution, no one
master copy of the September 28 print was preserved as such. 6 Neverthe-
less, according to a 1961 Senate document authored by Denys P. Myers, a
former State Department officer who carefully examined historical records
after the Department received an inquiry from a foreign government for
an "official" copy of the Constitution of the United States:
The failure to designate some copy as the archetype to be regarded
as the final text of reference created no question for many
years. . . .The text printed in the session laws of 1789, which was
undoubtedly reproduced from a copy of the print of September 28,
1787, was accepted as the real thing. . . .For approximately a cen-
tury this printed archetype was the model followed in official edi-
tions of the laws and the other governmental issues. Discrepancies in
editing crept in-the texts printed with the laws in the official edi-
tions of 1796, 1815 and 1845 are not identical. On the other hand,
the frequent prints for the use of the Houses of Congress in what
became the Senate and House Manuals reproduced the printed ar-
chetype with great fidelity . . .
Meanwhile, what became of the Philadelphia parchment-which, after
all, had also been authorized by the Convention delegates during the mo-
mentous days of September, 1787? For many years, the document was
apparently lost or forgotten, buried in the disorganized files of the old
13. "In an instrument of ratification it is customary to repeat word for word the document which
is ratified." Id. at 70-71. The four states departing from this custom were Connecticut, Delaware,
Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Id. All thirteen ratification instruments, including the nine re-
prints of the September 28 text, may be found in 2 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF ROLLS AND
LIBRARY, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1787-1870,
at 24-203 (1894).
14. See Acts Passed at a Congress of the United States of America, Begun and Held at the City
of New-York, on Wednesday the Fourth of March in the Year M, DCC, LXXXIX iii (1789) (Childes
& Swaine, publishers, New York) (emphasis added).
15. Id. at i.
16. S. Doc. No. 49, supra note I, at 67-94.
17. Id. at 89, 60, 49.
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Confederation. In 1818, Congress directed that the theretofore secret offi-
cial journal of the Philadelphia Convention be published. Secretary of
State John Quincy Adams supervised the compilation of the primary doc-
uments, and the product of his labors was published in 181 9.18 Although
this publication failed to include the text of the engrossed parchment, the
work of organizing loose files apparently brought to light its original four
pages.19 The following year, the State Department published an edition of
the engrossed text as an item of historical interest.20
Two factors account for the parchment's later ascendancy. First, re-
peated reprinting of the September 28 print resulted in increasing num-
bers of discrepancies due to compounded printers' errors; yet, as noted
above, no single copy of the print had been preserved as an official touch-
stone. As a result, "[w]hen accumulated variations were sought to be cor-
rected by collation with an original, the engrossed copy. . . was the only
known archetype."'" Second, in 1876 the State Department put the hand-
signed engrossed parchment on public display side by side with the hand-
signed engrossed parchment of the Declaration of Independence. The
centennial magic of the Declaration at the 1876 Philadelphia exposition
rubbed off on its constitutional counterpart. In effect, the parchment Con-
stitution was gilt by association, and became in popular folklore the Con-
stitution, the icon of a nation desperately in need of unifying symbols in
the wake of the Civil War. This time, it was the September 28 print that
was forgotten in the excitement. The transition from print to parchment
was as quick and dramatic as it was unconscious and uninformed: Only
two years later, in 1878, the parchment was first reproduced under the
direction of Congress as the apparent official text of the Constitution. 2
Since then, "the engrossed copy of the Constitution has been the com-
monly accepted archetype. It has been regularly reproduced from that pe-
riod in both the House and Senate Manuals and in the United States
Code.""3 While the four page parchment has been on public display for
over 100 years,2 ' the printed archetype has faded into the mists of history.
18. 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 4, at xii.
19. S. Doc. No. 49, supra note 1, at 53 & n.17.
20. Id. at 89.
21. Id. at 61.
22. Id. at 49, 54, 91-92. See Revised Statutes of the United States (2d ed. 1878).
23. S. Doc. No. 49, supra note 1, at 54.
24. From the mid 1880's until 1921, the parchment was on display at the Department of State.
From 1924 to 1952, the document was exhibited at the Library of Congress, and was thereafter
transferred to the National Archives.
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II. MORALS OF THE TALE
A. First Principles
What are we to make of all this? First of all, we must of course decide
which set of ink spots is, from a legal point of view, the official copy of the
Constitution. To be sure, given the de minimis nature of the differences
between print and parchment, few, if any, important legal issues should
turn on our choice of text.25 It is, after all, "a constitution we are ex-
pounding.""8 Yet precisely because of this-precisely because we are deal-
ing with one of the most important legal texts in human history-a cer-
tain degree of fastidiousness seems appropriate.
Fastidiousness also yields educational advantages, for our choice of texts
requires us to dust off and put to work first principles. And with these
principles in mind, the choice of the September 28 print over the Septem-
ber 17 parchment is easy. The point here is not that individual delegates
in Convention and Congress were more likely to have relied on precursors
of the print than on the parchment itself. Rather, it is that if we seek to
find our true higher law, we must look beyond Philadelphia and New
York. The Constitution is our supreme law, superior to ordinary legisla-
tion, simply because its source was the supreme lawmaker, superior to
ordinary legislatures: "We the People of the United States." Once we re-
member that it was popular ratification that transformed a mere proposal
into binding law,27 we cannot but choose as our supreme legal text the
edition that was in fact offered to and endorsed by the People of the
United States ipsissimis verbis; namely, the September 28 print.
Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists in the late 1780's shared a pas-
25. Of course, I am not suggesting that seemingly small points of punctuation are never relevant
to our interpretation of constitutional text. See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separat-
ing the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REv. 205, 217 n.50 (1985) (relying on punctua-
tion of exceptions and regulations clause); Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 901 (1984) (same). The punctua-
tion differences between print and parchment, however, largely involve details of capitalization, abbre-
viation, and the choice between colons and semi-colons-differences which I, at least, believe unlikely
to lead to significant differences in interpretation.
Professor Farrand offers a fascinating account of a clause in which an apparently small change in
punctuation was attempted in order to effect a large change in meaning. According to Farrand,
Gouverneur Morris, as chief draftsman of Philadelphia Committee of Style, unsuccessfully attempted
to substitute a semi-colon for a comma separating the purposive "to pay the debts and provide for the
common defence and general welfare" clause from the rest of the taxing clause of art. I, § 8, para. 1.
As punctuated by Morris, the clause might have implied an independent power in Congress to pursue
the general welfare, thus circumventing the gaps created by the other enumerations of Article I. See
M. FARRAND, supra note 7, at 182-83; see also 3 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 4, at 379 (re-
marks of Albert Gallatin in House of Representatives supporting Farrand's account of Morris' machi-
nations); id. at 456-58 (excerpts from Memoirs of John Quincy Adams) (firsthand account of re-
newed debate about national power and punctuation of general welfare clause, sparked by Adams'
1819 printing of Convention records, including Committee of Style draft of September 12).
26. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
27. See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 403; THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 152 (A. Hamilton) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961); id. No. 40, at 253 (J. Madison); 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 4, at 253
(remarks of James Wilson).
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sionate devotion to the idea of popular sovereignty, and understood its
legal implications.28 It is thus not surprising that when the first Congress
in 1789 ordered the printing of a "correct" copy of the Constitution (an
adjective, parenthetically, that has never again appeared in any congres-
sional directive concerning constitutional publication),29 nobody doubted
the correctness of the September 28 print. Nor is it surprising that this
print, as reprinted by Childes and Swaine, stood as the official text for
almost a century.
What does seem surprising is that Americans in 1876 apparently forgot
their true Constitution even as they set out to publicly celebrate their his-
tory. And yet perhaps we should not be so surprised. In this, our own
year of commemoration, we may well be committing some of the same
mistakes. Even more sobering, our mistakes today may not be limited to
our popular celebrations, but may well infect our case law and our schol-
arship-and their effects may not be de minimis.
B. Of Law and History
1. Half-hearted History
One partial explanation for the mid-nineteenth century shift from print
to parchment is sheer sloppiness of historical research: Americans came to
accept the parchment as their official Constitution because they had for-
gotten that any other version existed, and legal historians neglected to re-
mind them.30 To put the point more softly, the accessibility of historical
materials tends to skew the enterprise of legal history. When print was
accessible and parchment not, lawyers used print; when the relative acces-
sibility of the documents changed, so did lawyers' habits.
Something similar happens today. In interpreting the Constitution,
judges, litigators, and even law professors tend to rely most on those pri-
mary sources that are most accessible-namely, The Federalist Papers
and Max Farrand's The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787.
Both are still in print, easy to read, relatively short, carefully indexed,
easily found in libraries and book stores, and available in inexpensive
(and thus easy-to-own) paperback editions. Other primary sources (such
as pamphlets written during the ratification era by men other than Ham-
ilton, Madison and Jay"' and records of various state ratifying conven-
28. See generally Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1429-66 (1987).
29. S. Doc. No. 49, supra note 1, at 92.
30. Even if one believes, as I do, that the Constitution may be amended by certain forms of
popular referenda that transcend the formal requirements of Article V, see infra text accompanying
note 50, it would be difficult to argue that popular acceptance of the parchment in and after 1876
constitutes such a de facto amendment. Not only was no vote ever taken on anything, but the People
of America have never even been made aware of the existence of competing texts from which to
choose. In any event, the issue is largely mooted by the de minimis character of the differences be-
tween the two texts.
31. See, e.g., PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (P. Ford ed. 1888 &
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tions32) receive far less attention-at least in part, I believe, because these
documents are less accessible to lawyers.
Once again, first principles suggest that we reconsider our choice of
texts. Just as the parchment signed by the Convention is inferior to the
September 28 print because the latter is the People's Constitution, so pri-
mary sources from the Convention should be inferior to primary sources
from the ratification period because the latter comprise the People's legis-
lative history of the People's law. The People in 1787-88 had no access to
the then-secret records of the Philadelphia Convention. Indeed, James
Madison delayed publication of his notes from Philadelphia until after his
death in 1836 in part because of his desire that the Convention records be
subordinated to the public legislative history of constitutional ratification:
Mr. [Madison] said, he did not believe a single instance could be
cited in which the sense of the Convention had been required or
admitted as material in any Constitutional question ...
But, after all, whatever veneration might be entertained for the
body of men who formed our Constitution, the sense of that body
could never be regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the
Constitution. As the instrument came from them, it was nothing
more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life
and validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speak-
ing through the several State Conventions.33
This way of thinking about constitutional history confirms the primacy
of The Federalist: Not only is it the most comprehensive, rich, and cogent
work of those who supported the Constitution, it was expressly written to
explain and defend that document to the People during the ratification
period-and was widely used for that very purpose. On the other hand,
primary reliance on Madison's notes becomes more problematic. At best,
the notes should be seen as accurate but indirect evidence of the way
many leaders in 1787 thought, and of the things that many are likely to
have said during the ratification process in speeches and conversations of
which no reliable transcript exists today.
In theory, records of the state ratifying conventions are better evidence
than records from Philadelphia, because ratification debates by defini-
tions4 constitute popular and public history-history of, by, and for the
republished 1971).
32. See, e.g., J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1888).
33. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1796) (remarks of Rep. James Madison); see also 3 FARRAND
RECORDS, supra note 4, at 447-48 (Sept. 15, 1821 letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie);
R. KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 661-62 (1971). See generally Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 921, 938-39 (1985).
34. The word "convention" is an 18th century term of art denoting an assembly that is the virtual
embodiment of the People. See Amar, supra note 28, at 1459-60; see also G. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 306-89 (1969); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discov-
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People. However, recent historical research has cast doubt on the accuracy
of the various transcripts of ratification debates, and so other primary
sources, more indirect but more accurate, may be preferable. 5 One obvi-
ous possibility often overlooked today is the rich assortment of pam-
phlets-pro and con-generated during the ratification struggle. Of
course, we must exercise special caution in using writings of those who
opposed the Constitution and lost; their understandings of the meaning of
the document may often be inferior to the Federalists'. But in many cases,
Anti-Federalist literature may help 20th century lawyers confirm Federal-
ist readings. For example, leading pamphleteers from the two camps often
agreed about what a particular clause (such as the preamble) 6 meant, or
whether a given doctrine (such as judicial review)17 was implicit in the
plan; they disagreed only about whether such provisions commended or
condemned the document.
The tendency of 20th century lawyers to undervalue less accessible his-
torical materials is perhaps most dramatic and unfortunate in our treat-
ment-or more precisely, our lack of treatment-of the historical materi-
als surrounding the Reconstruction Amendments. There are no primary
sources from this era analogous to The Federalist or even Farrand: The
Congressional records are scattered and hard to come by, and the sources
of popular legislative history during ratification are even more difficult to
locate and work with. All this leads me to wonder whether our undervalu-
ation of the Reconstruction primary sources has contributed to an under-
valuation of the Reconstruction Amendments themselves. We end up
thinking less about the Reconstruction than about the Founding, and may
therefore miss some of the beauty, some of the tragedy, and some of the
promise embedded in the Civil War Amendments. We are more likely to
mistakenly view the Amendments as an afterthought-a footnote-rather
than a glorious and agonizing rebirth of the nation. 8
2. Heroic History
If one moral of my story is that bad history can make bad law, another,
more ironic, lesson is that good history can sometimes do the same. His-
tory is largely storytelling, and good storytelling often calls for a hero.39
ering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1058-70 (1984).
35. See Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65
TEx. L. REv. 1 (1986).
36. See Amar, supra note 28, at 1450, 1455-56, 1461 n.157.
37. See G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA 130-35 (1981).
38. Nowhere is the devaluation of Reconstruction more evident than in college and law school
curricula in constitutional law courses. Our future leaders and lawyers spend far less time studying
primary sources from the Reconstruction than from the Founding. Cf Powell, supra note 33, at 945
(tracing increased "popular and legal interest" in original intent of framers and ratifiers to "growing
availability of original materials" during mid-nineteenth century).
39. See W. Cronon, Stories Without Heroes: Narrating Environmental Change (1987) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with author).
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But it is easier to spin an epic yarn about a handful of demigods in Phila-
delphia than about the thousands of relatively anonymous and more ordi-
nary citizens who made the Constitution law by ratifying it. Madison's
notes possess a Shakespearean drama, a Thucydidean pungence, that few
other primary sources can rival. Thus, it is not surprising that in telling
and re-telling each other the story of the 1780's, 19th and 20th century
Americans have focused on the "framers" at Philadelphia rather than the
"ratifiers" everywhere-a focus reflected and reinforced by the fascination
with the four page original that bears Their holographic signatures.
I do not mean to denigrate the importance of, or the need for, heroic
history. Part of the purpose of history, I believe, is to provide us today
with models of virtue in action whom we should aspire to emulate. 0 The
founding fathers shared this understanding of history. To take but two
examples, George Washington self-consciously patterned himself after the
Roman hero Cincinnatus, and the authors of The Federalist adopted the
pen name "Publius," another classical hero celebrated by the Roman his-
torian Plutarch.," The framers' understanding of heroic history was not
simply backward-looking. At the same time they looked to past heroes for
instruction and edification, they themselves sought to become heroes who
could inspire future generations.
They succeeded too well. The very grandeur of Washington, Madison,
and Hamilton distances them from us. They loom so large that we today
despair of ever equalling their greatness. And so instead of spurring us to
great deeds, the heroism of the demigods lulls us into a complacent accep-
tance of our own mediocrity. The Constitution becomes a closed book,
rather than an ever unfolding saga. The parchment becomes a literally
untouchable relic of a bygone age when giants walked the earth.
Our identification of the Constitution with a handful of mythic heroes
also leads us to sanitize history. Because we have personalized the docu-
ment, to dwell on its defects-the intricate network of clauses protecting
human slavery is of course the most dramatic example-is almost to levy a
personal attack on its "father," James Madison. And so we avert our eyes
from some clauses, we hesitate to say some things, lest we besmirch our
heroes and blaspheme our demigods.
3. Hermetically Sealed History
Most good stories have endings, and it has been tempting for Americans
to end the story of our Constitution prematurely in the 1780's. Thus, he-
roic history can all too easily decay into what I shall call hermetically
40. I think Bob Cover shared this view of history. See Tributes to Robert M. Cover, 96 YALE L.J.
1699, 1715-16 (1987) (tribute by Tanina Rostain).
41. See generally G. WILLS, supra note 37; D. ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS
(1974); G. WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1984).
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sealed history. The current display of the parchment at the National
Archives is illustrative: Awestruck, we gaze at a closed, self-contained,
18th century collection of yellowed papers whose distance from us is un-
derscored by its quaint capitalization of every noun, its proud display of
signatures of great men long dead, and its very handwrittenness. Symboli-
cally, at least, the September 28 print seems preferable. Precisely because
it is "only" a print, it is more open, more continuous with subsequent
amendments, less forbidding and untouchable, more usable and popular.4
(Indeed, it is also quite human: For example, Article III of the print con-
tains an obvious printer's error in its reference to "inferior court" instead
of "inferior courts.")
43
Perhaps I am reading too much into the iconography of public exhibi-
tion. After all, how we display the Constitution is far less important than
how we interpret it. But the way we exhibit the document simultaneously
mirrors and shapes the way we think about it, and, thus, the way we give
it legal meaning. And here, whatever its source, the danger of hermetically
sealed history is very real.
Richard Epstein's recent book, Takings, offers a nice illustration.44 Pro-
fessor Epstein's basic argument is that redistributive legislation offends the
deep structure of the federal Constitution. If we look only at the 18th
century Constitution, hermetically sealed, Epstein's interpretation is quite
plausible, though not beyond doubt; without too much eyestrain, the tak-
ings, contracts, bill of attainder, bills of credit and ex post facto clauses
can all be seen as embodiments of a general anti-redistributive constitu-
tional ethos. However, once we widen our focus to the entire Constitution,
as amended, it is hard to reach Epstein's result without serious squinting.
In 1913, We the People of the United States ratified the Sixteenth
Amendment to our Constitution expressly authorizing a federal income
tax. The popular legislative history of ratification reveals not merely an
endorsement of an income tax simpliciter, but popular approval of a pre-
dictably progressive-that is, a redistributive-income tax. However
42. In contrast to a handwritten parchment that can be in only one place at a time, a printed
constitution enjoys dramatic democratic possibilities, which were nicely captured by Thomas Paine's
discussion of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776:
It was the political bible of the state. Scarcely a family was without it. Every member of the
government had a copy; and nothing was more common, when any debate arose on the princi-
ple of a bill, or on the extent of any species of authority, than for the members to take the
printed constitution out of their pocket, and read the chapter with which [such] matter in
debate was connected.
T. PAINE, RIHrs OF MAN, Part II, 28 (4th American ed. 1794), reprinted in THE LIFE AND
MAJOR WRITINGs OF THOMAS PAINE 345, 378 (P. Foner ed. 1945).
43. See infra Appendix I. Given that the omission of the letter "s" is an obvious printer's er-
ror-as confirmed by the preceding sentence of Article III and by Article I, § 8, cl. 9, both of which
refer to "inferior courts"-nothing should turn on this mistake, except a realization that the framers
were not perfect. For that very reason, the path to constitutional amendment was left open. See infra
text accompanying note 50.
44. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985).
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broadly one reads the provisions of the 18th century Constitution, are not
subsequent constitutional amendments entitled to at least as broad a
reading?"5
To see the point more sharply, consider the following question: May a
woman serve as President of the United States? If we focus solely on the
18th century Constitution, hermetically sealed, a plausible (though by no
means decisive) argument can be made for ineligibility. Over and over,
Article II uses the words "he" and "his" to refer to the President. (Arti-
cles I and III, incidentally, have no analogous language concerning Repre-
sentatives, Senators, and Judges.) Of course, it is quite possible that the
masculine pronouns in Article II were intended to apply generically to
both sexes. However, contemporaneous usage tends to weaken this hy-
pothesis. For example, an early draft of the fugitive slave clause used the
phrase "He or She," suggesting that the masculine pronoun was generally
understood as gender-specific."' Nor can we assume that the men who
wrote and ratified the Constitution used "he" unthinkingly, never imagin-
ing that a woman could serve as a head of state. Virginia, after all, took
its name from one such woman (Elizabeth) and its oldest school (William
and Mary) bore the name of another. Yet never, to my knowledge, was
the President likened to a Queen during the ratification era-although
references to Kings were commonplace.
But however broadly we read the text and history of Article II, is not
the promise of the Nineteenth Amendment entitled to at least as broad a
reading? Admittedly, that Amendment does not explicitly modify Article
II-but Article II of course does not explicitly require that the President
be male, in sharp contrast to its clear mandate that the President, for
example, be at least 35 years of age. 47 Once we widen our focus-as we
45. It is revealing that in a 350 page book, Professor Epstein devotes exactly one footnote to the
Sixteenth Amendment. Despite his willingness early on to read the Constitution as "drawling] on the
basic theory developed by Locke," id. at 31, Epstein shows a curious unwillingness to look in similar
fashion beyond constitutional text to historical context when discussing the 1913 Amendment. Instead,
Epstein blandly asserts-without any historical analysis-that the Amendment "does not address fair-
ness between individuals." Id. at 296 n.42.
Although this essay is not the place to attempt to adduce detailed evidence casting doubt on Ep-
stein's claim, surely the issue deserves more attention than his book accords it.
46. 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 4, at 577 (Committee of Style Draft).
One should not place great weight on this rather slender datum. For one thing, the rejection of the
draft language may have been based, at least in part, on stylistic concerns about the redundancy of the
words "or She." More important, even if it could be convincingly demonstrated that the delegates at
Philadelphia used the words "he" and "his" to refer only to men, it would remain to be shown that
the People shared this understanding during ratification. In the event of any divergence between a
secret language created by the Philadelphia delegates and the popular understanding of the Constitu-
tion's words during the ratification era, the latter must of course guide legal interpretation.
47. In phrasing my argument in this way, I seek to sidestep the "level of generality" question that
confronts anyone who attempts to faithfully interpret constitutional text. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DisTRusT 61 (1980). Thus, I do not argue that after the adoption of the Twenty-sixth Amend-
ment, the President need be only 18 years old. Since Article II is far more explicit than the Amend-
ment on the issue of age and Presidential eligibility, any argument that the later text repealed the




must-beyond our hermetically sealed parchment, we must give due re-
spect to the vision of political equality informing the Nineteenth Amend-
ment-a vision that has implications not just for presidential eligibility,
but also, I believe, for gender equality in jury selection,4 and perhaps for
other areas as well.49
a. Our Conservative Constitution
There is a more general point here. Because the Constitution was writ-
ten and ratified in the past, in one sense it is almost by definition a "con-
servative" document. This is perhaps one of the reasons that political con-
servatives today are more likely than liberals to pledge allegiance to
"original intent." But conservatives sometimes cheat: They exaggerate the
natural conservatism of the document by paying undue attention to the
18th century parchment and by slighting more recent amendments. The
world view of a Richard Epstein or a William Rehnquist may well be
closer to the Federalists' of the 1780's than to the Republicans' of the
1860's or the Progressives' of the 1910's, but any attempt to faithfully
discern and apply the Constitution must take more modern expressions of
popular sovereignty at least as seriously as more ancient ones. Mine is not
an invitation to noninterpretivism based on a vague theory of changed
circumstances, but a reminder to interpretivists to respect the sovereign
right of post-eighteenth century Americans to alter their form of govern-
ment by constitutional amendment.
b. Our Radical Constitution
If the Constitution is in one sense conservative, in two other obvious
senses it is quite radical. First, its foundational principle-popular sover-
eignty-empowers the People even as it limits their government servants.
Because of popular sovereignty, We the People of 1987 need not be bound
by words penned in 1787, but may alter those words at will by constitu-
tional amendment. No constitutional provision is a straightjacket any
longer than We wish it to be. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that popu-
lar sovereignty, properly understood, implies that the People today may
amend their Constitution in ways that transcend the formal rules of Arti-
cle V.5" To believe otherwise is to kill the principle that gives the Consti-
tution life, and allow the hand of a People long dead to thwart the sover-
eign right of the American People today to govern themselves.
Second, any theory of constitutional interpretation that takes the docu-
48. See Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE LJ. 1283 (1984) (discussing
parallels between voting and serving on juries).
49. Cf Calabresi, Bakke As Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 OATH. U.L. REV. 427, 441 n.33 (1979) (explor-
ing Nineteenth Amendment's implications for affirmative action for women).
50. See Amar, supra note 28, at 1464-65; accord Ackerman, supra note 34, at 1056-70.
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ment seriously coexists uneasily with the principles of gradualism and re-
spect for precedent. Suppose, for example, that on the basis of newly dis-
covered historical evidence, an interpretivist judge is convinced that earlier
cases, around which expectations have now crystallized, have misinter-
preted the meaning of the People's supreme law. By what right does that
judge follow precedent and thus judicially amend the Constitution?5' The
question has been highlighted by the recent confirmation hearings of Rob-
ert Bork, who apparently believes that many 20th century Supreme Court
cases are incorrect because they deviate from the text, history, and struc-
ture of the Constitution.
Indeed, the existence of the September 28 print provides an apt hypo-
thetical: What if, on the basis of this print, an interpretivist judge believes
earlier case law of a given clause (based on the differently punctuated
parchment) is in error? Fortunately, I do not believe any sophisticated
interpretivist need ever reach this question. The differences between print
and parchment seem to me far too minor to affect the document's mean-
ing. Properly understood, interpretivism is not a cryptographic hunt for
the Constitution's secret meaning, but a modest and commonsensical en-
terprise that does not seek more determinacy than the sources fairly yield.
To be sure, a careful examination of constitutional text, history and struc-
ture will often leave us with a clear answer.52 At other times, however,
the most the document can yield is the right set of questions to ask our-
selves.5" No group of words-old or new, conservative or radical-can do
more.
III. CONCLUSION
Ironically, the very boldness of script with which the National Archives
parchment proclaims its first three words invites us to reconsider the docu-
ment's authoritative status as the official copy of the Constitution. If taken
seriously, those three words-and the theory of popular sovereignty be-
51. Perhaps this rhetorical question could be neutralized by two counterquestions, also rooted in
interpretivism: By what right do judges treat case law interpreting the Constitution with less respect
than case law interpreting statutes? If the Article III phrase "judicial power" permits (or requires)
respect for precedent when dealing with statutes or treaties, why doesn't that same phrase permit (or
require) respect for precedent when dealing with the Constitution?
The standard answer to these questions-that precedent must be accorded less weight in constitu-
tional law because "correction" of an erroneous constitutional case "through legislative action is prac-
tically impossible," Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)-is forceful but perhaps a bit too quick. Cf Amar, supra note 25, at 258 n.170 (discussing
jurisdiction-stripping statute, passed by ordinary legislative process, as possible means of circum-
venting extant judicial precedent).
Thus, the relationship between interpretivism and precedent is more complicated than my initial
rhetorical question in the text may indicate.
52. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 28, at 1473-84 (suggesting clear answers to questions surrounding
meaning of Eleventh Amendment); Amar, supra note 25 (suggesting clear answer to question regard-
ing congressional power to strip jurisdiction from federal courts).
53. Cf Amar, supra note 25, at 258 n.169 (noting that language of Fourteenth Amendment is far
less precise than language of Article III).
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hind them-point us towards another document: the September 28 print.
Most important, those three words invite us to reconsider how we use
history to interpret our supreme law, and how we can make history by
changing it.
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Appendix I: A Comparative Sample of Print and Parchment
September 28 Print"'
ARTICLE III.
Sect. I. The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior
court, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated
times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be dimin-
ished during their continuance in office.
Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity,
arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction; to controverises to which the United States
shall be a party; to controversies between two or more states, between a
state and citizens of another state, between citizens of different states, be-
tween citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different
states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citi-
zens or subjects.
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and those in which a state shall be party, the supreme court shall have
original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the supreme
court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.





Section. 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall,
at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Section. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls;-to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between
Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.
55. The complete text of this edition can be found at S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-21
(1973).
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Appendix II: A Summary of Major Constitutional Drafts
Document Comments
September 12 print Draft prepared by Philadelphia Committee
of Style; working paper of Convention del-
egates during final days at Philadelphia.
September 17 parchment Authorized on September 15 by Philadel-
phia Convention; signed by 39 delegates
two days later; sent to Congress in New
York; apparently lost until 1818; on dis-
play at National Archives.
September 18 print Authorized simultaneously with parch-
ment; differed from parchment in punctua-
tion, etc.; probably provided basis for
working paper of members of Congress;
provided basis for September 28 print.
September 28 print Authorized by Congress; based on Septem-
ber 18 print; reprinted in states for use by
the People during ratification; expressly in-
cluded in nine state ratification instru-
ments; reprinted as "correct" copy of Con-
stitution in 1789 under direction of new
government.
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